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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

Case No. 950350-CA

CLINT DONALD YOUNG,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for forgery, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1995).
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES QN APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court violate rules 404(b) or 403 of the

Utah Rules of Evidence by allowing a witness to testify about a
Circle A Outfitter check that defendant forged after he tendered
the Circle A Outfitter check in this case?
When an appellate court reviews a trial court's
determination about the admissibility of evidence under rules 403
or 4 04 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, the reviewing court will
sustain the ruling unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion.

State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1221 (Utah 1993); State v. Morrell.
803 P.2d 292, 296 (Utah App. 1990).
2.

Was defendant adequately represented at trial in accord

with his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel?
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance
prejudiced defendant.

Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668,

687 (1984); State v. Oliver. 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991),
cert, denied. 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).

The claim presents a

question of law, reviewed on the record of the underlying trial.
See State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION?f STATUTES, AND RULE?
Utah Rule of Evidence 403, governing exclusion of relevant
evidence, provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides:

2

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person
in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such a proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
STATEMENT OF THE CASS
Defendant was charged with one count of forgery for passing
a check of $100 or more in an Orem Albertson's on May 1, 1994
(R.18).

After defendant was bound over to district court, his

counsel filed a motion in limine uto limit any prior criminal
history or bad acts of the defendant" (R. 33). The court
postponed ruling on the motion until trial. At that juncture, it
denied the motion and allowed the testimony (R. 357). Defendant
was convicted as charged.

The court sentenced defendant to one

to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison and levied fines and
restitution (160-62) . This timely appeal followed (R. 172) .
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS
On a slow Sunday evening in early May, 1994, defendant
presented a three-party, computer-generated payroll check, made
out to Clint D. Young for $396.69, to an Albertson's checker in
Orem (R. 266, 268, 270, 289, addendum A).

Suspicious of the

check's authenticity, the checker took a good look at defendant
3

and asked him for his driver's license (R. 272-73).

He then

compared the picture on the license, which belonged to Clint D.
Young, with the individual standing in front of him.

Except for

partial changes &n facial hair, the individual matched the
picture (R. 275). The checker also compared the number on the
driver's license with the number appearing on the check.

They,

too, matched (R. 276). The checker asked defendant to write his
telephone number on the back of the check and endorse it, and
defendant complied (R. 276).
The checker testified at trial:
[A]ny time we see a dot matrix printer and
the double signature line like this, that 90
percent of the time they're a bad check. So
I wasn't going to take it until I saw the
initials right up here, which stands for one
of our managers in our store. So we're
taught if a manager approves it, we take it.
So I took it.
(R. 268).
In order to cash the check, the checker needed more money
and so called the manager on duty, a different manager than the
one who had apparently initialed the check earlier.

The manager

brought the money down and took a good look at the person
tendering the check (R. 293).

4

Several days later, the check was returned to the store's
bookkeeper (R. 294). Subsequent investigation and trial
testimony revealed that the check had been written on a Circle A
Outfitter accounb which was closed in 1989; that John Norris, one
of two signatories on the account and one of the names that
appeared on the bad check, had died in a car accident in 1993;
and that the telephone number defendant wrote on the back of the
check at the request of the checker was not the telephone number
of Clint Young nor did anyone at that number know of a Clint
Young (R. 300-04, 310, 318-19).
An Orem police detective investigated the case (R. 308). He
showed an enlarged photo of Clint Young, taken from his driver's
license, to the Albertson's checker, who recognized Young as the
person who had presented the check (R. 312).
Nineteen days after the Albertson's incident, defendant
tendered a check for $150, also written on the Circle A Outfitter
account, at another grocery store in West Valley City (R. 388,
390, 392) . Because Holly Hales, manager of the store, had known
defendant since childhood, she okayed the check without ever
looking at the signature, which bore the name not of defendant
but of "Doug Renterio" (R. 389, 391, addendum B).
also returned as a forgery.
5

This check was

Some months later, at the Orem police station, the
investigating detective asked defendant to produce a writing
sample (R. 314-15) . Defendant began the task but did not
complete it, annpuncing that he had written enough (R. 317).
Because defendant refused to complete the requested writing
sample and because the limited sample that defendant did produce
was printed, rather than in the requested cursive writing, only
the signatures on defendant's driver's license and on the forged
check could be analyzed and compared (R. 333, 380). A
handwriting expert testified "that it was highly probable that
both of these handwritings were created by the same individual"
(R. 363). All that prevented the expert from making a "positive"
identification was the paucity of cursive writing available for
analysis (R. 364).
Defendant denied any involvement in the Albertson's check
forgery.

He claimed that he had never been in the Orem

Albertson's, and that he "did not cash the one at Albertson's at
all" (R. 398). He also asserted that he had lost his driver's
license a year before and so could not have presented it as
identification in order to cash the check at issue here (R. 4 02).

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible
error when it failed to balance the probativeness of Holly
Hales's testimony' against its potential for unfair prejudice, as
required by Utah Rule of Evidence 403. While defendant raised
the issue in a pre-trial motion, he stood silent as the court
admitted the testimony under rule 404(b) without analyzing it
under rule 403. Because counsel did not alert the court as to
its omission, he is precluded from raising the issue for the
first time on appeal.
Any recourse to plain error as a way around the waiver
doctrine fails because the testimony of Holly Hales did not
unfairly prejudice defendant.

First, if the trial court had

complied with rule 4 03, the testimony would have been admitted.
And, second, even if the testimony was admitted in error, the
error was harmless because there was no reasonable likelihood
that, absent the testimony, the result of the trial would have
been different.
Defendant also argues that he received constitutionally
ineffective assistance of counsel. He cites three instances of
deficient performance: first, his counsel's failure to object to
the trial court's omission of the 403 balancing test; second; his
7

counsel's failure to object to the scope of Holly Hales's
testimony; and, third, his counsel's failure to request a
limiting jury instruction concerning how Holly Hales's testimony
could be used,

intimately, defendant's ineffective assistance

claim fails because he has not demonstrated any prejudice
resulting from his counsel's alleged shortcomings.

Just as any

error in the trial court's failure to make an evidentiary ruling
proved to be harmless, so any deficient performance on the part
of defendant's trial counsel failed to create a reasonable
probability of a different outcome for him.
ARGUMENT
PQINT QNE
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
ALLOWING HOLLY HALES TO TESTIFY;
AND, IN ANY EVENT, HER TESTIMONY
DID NOT PREJUDICE THE OUTCOME OF
THE CASE
Defendant does not argue that the challenged testimony was
inadmissible under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence. Rather,
he claims that the trial court erred by failing to conduct the
balancing test required by rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence,
prior to allowing Holly Hales to testify about receiving a bad
check from defendant on the Circle A Outfitter account at another
grocery store.

Consistent with the rationale for the court's
8

404(b) ruling, argues defendant, the testimony should have been
limited to "opportunity" or "identity" -- that is, "to testimony
that Hales saw [defendant] in possession of a check from the same
account as that jased in the forgery committed at Albertson's"
(Br. of App. at 12).
Defendant originally raised the rule 404(b) and 403 issues
in a motion in limine, in which he requested "to limit any prior
criminal history or bad acts of the defendant" (R. 33). Terming
the motion "a shotgun approach to the supposed evidence to be
adduced at time of trial," the court "refrain[ed] from a general
ruling," opting to "consider at the time of trial the objections
of counsel for defendant" (R. 56 or addendum C).

The court also

ordered counsel for the State not to "inquire into other crimes,
wrongs or bad acts of the defendant without first acquiring the
court's permission to do so."

Id.

Subsequently, defense counsel

withdrew from the case, and new counsel was appointed (R. 63,
64) .
At trial, counsel for the State, as directed, asked
permission before calling Holly Hales as a witness (R. 345).
Counsel explained that because the identity of defendant as the
person who passed the check had been put at issue in opening
argument, Hales's testimony, going to both defendant's identity
9

and his access to the Circle A Outfitter checks, qualified for
admission under rule 404(b) (R. 345, 346-47).

Defendant

responded that the incidents were too factually dissimilar to
warrant admissibility (R. 352). The court then ruled:
That he certainly has had an opportunity to
have these checks. And I think for that
purpose I will allow her to testify. And
then the jury can give it whatever weight it
wants. And argue whatever you want, but the
opportunity is there if he had those checks
in his hand, at least that one check in his
hand, and that can be definitely identified
as being his. So there's an opportunity to
get to these checks of which an account had
already been closed.
(R. 357). Following the court's 404(b) ruling, the trial
continued and, later, Holly Hales testified.

Defense counsel,

whose predecessor had initially filed the motion in limine
requesting that evidence be limited pursuant to rules 404(b),
403, and 609, stood silently by.

He did not renew the 403

objection or otherwise alert the court that it had neglected to
balance the probativeness of the evidence against its potential

10

for unfair prejudice.1

Instead, counsel simply watched the court

commit what he now claims was prejudicial error.
Utah Rule of Evidence 103(a) requires

wx

a clear and definite

objection' at trial to preserve an evidentiary error for appeal."
State v. Eldredae. 773 P.2d 29, 34-35 (Utah), cert•fleiUgd,493
U.S.

814 (1989).

Failing to make such an objection denies the

trial court the opportunity to correct the alleged error in a
timely fashion. Under such circumstances, the objection is
normally waived.

See, e.g., State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781, 785

(Utah 1992).
Absent any assertion by defendant that exceptional
circumstances exist, appellate review will, therefore, be
available only if defendant can demonstrate that the trial court
committed "plain error."

State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah

1

Once the evidence had been ruled admissible under rule
404(b), defendant could only benefit from drawing the court's
attention to its omission and consequently regaining one further
opportunity to exclude the evidence. If a trial court fails to
engage in a 403 analysis, defendant should logically bear the
burden of raising the issue because defendant is the only party
who stands to benefit from the ruling. See Nelson v. State. 864
S.W.2d 496, 499 (Tex.Cr.App. 1993)(holding that defendant failed
to preserve his 403 objection by not objecting on 403 grounds
after the court had overruled his 404(b) objection); State v.
Cannon, 713 P.2d 273 (Ariz. 1985)(holding that the trial court is
not required sua sponte to rule on whether the admission of
defendant's statement would result in unfair prejudice).
11

1989).

To do so, defendant must establish three elements: first,

that an error occurred; second, that the error was obvious; and
third, that the error was harmful.

State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201,

1208 (Utah 1993); £££ State v. Verde. 770 P.2d at 122.

If any

one of these elements is missing, plain error cannot be found.
State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1209.
Even if defendant's claim is interpreted as an assertion of
plain error, which he did not argue, it would fail.

First, while

defendant's trial counsel failed to object to the court's
omission of the 4 03 analysis, the error was not harmful because
the weighing of probativeness against unfair prejudice would have
rendered Holly Hales's testimony admissible.

That is, any error

committed in failing to apply rule 403 or in failing to object to
the omission was obviated by the correctness of the trial court's
ultimate ruling in admitting the testimony.
Under rule 403, evidence "may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed
prejudice. . . . "

by the danger of

unfair

Utah R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added).

Whether

the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice is a "fact-intensive question."
Morrell. 803 P.2d 292, 295 (Utah App. 1990).

State v.

"Standing alone,

the fact that the evidence may be prejudicial to defendant does
12

not necessarily render the evidence incompetent. . . If evidence
is prejudicial but is at least equally probative of a critical
fact, it is properly admissible."

State v. Taylor. 818 P.2d 561,

571 (Utah App. 1691).
A trial court may consider a variety of factors in balancing
the probativeness of the evidence against its potential for
unfair prejudice.

These factors include u'the strength of the

evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the
similarities between the crimes, the interval of time that has
elapsed between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the
efficacy of alternative proof and the degree to which the
evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering
hostility."'

State v. Shickles. 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah

1988)(quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence. § 190. at 565 (3d
ed. 1984)).
Under this standard, the testimony of Holly Hales was
admissible because it showed that defendant cashed a check on the
same closed account at another grocery store just eighteen days
after this incident.

Because Hales was a competent eyewitness,

well-acquainted with defendant, she provided strdng evidence of
defendant's guilt in uttering the second check.

££. Morrell. 803

P.2d at 296 (strong evidence of defendant's guilt in view of
13

competent eyewitness testimony).

The reasonable inferences to be

drawn from Hales's testimony were that defendant had access to
the Circle A Outfitter checks and that he had been accurately
identified by the two Albertson's employees.

Hales's testimony

was thus highly probative to show both that defendant had access
to the checks and that he was the individual who also cashed the
check at Albertson's.

The trial court, therefore, correctly

admitted the evidence, even though it omitted an analytical step
in so doing.
Furthermore, Hales's testimony would also have been
admissible under rule 403 because defense counsel put the matter
of defendant's identity as the individual who passed the check at
Albertson's directly at issue.

He told the jury during opening

argument:
Our defense is that it was not Mr. Young that
did this. Mr. Young lost his driver's
license well over a year ago. So somebody
had his driver's license, and somebody had
some blank checks, and somebody made a check
out to Clint Young, and somebody used his
driver's license. There must have been some
similarity in the look -- I don't know how it
got by the cashier — but it wasn't Mr. Young
who did it.
(R. 256-57).

With this theory of the case before the jury, the

State had to adduce evidence showing that defendant was the

14

person who passed the Circle A Outfitter check at Albertson's.
Holly Hales's testimony, which showed defendant had access to the
Circle A Outfitter checks and which corroborated the
identification o£ defendant previously made by the Albertson's
checker and the manager on duty, was thus highly probative as
rebuttal to defendant's theory of the case.

Finally, Hales's

testimony was not the sort of inflammatory evidence that would be
likely to "rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.'' Shickles.
760 P.2d at 296.
Second, if defendant's claim is interpreted as an assertion
of plain error, it also fails because, even assuming arguendo
that the trial court should not have admitted the evidence, any
error in its admission was harmless.

Harmless errors "are

sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings."

State v. Verde. 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989);

Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a); Utah R. Evid. 103(a).

In order to

warrant reversal, the likelihood of a different result "must be
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict."

State

v. Kniaht. 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 1987).
To determine whether an error is harmful, a reviewing court
considers "a host of factors including, among others, the
15

importance of the witness's testimony to the prosecution's case
and the overall strength of the State's case."

State v.

Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1991)(citing State v. Hackford.
737 P.2d 200, 20B (Utah 1987)).
In this case, totally apart from Holly Hales's testimony,
the State's case against defendant was strong.

Two eyewitnesses

unequivocally identified defendant as the individual who tendered
the check (R. 277, 293-94).

A police detective testified that he

asked defendant to produce a handwriting sample, but that
defendant only partially complied (R. 314, 317). A reasonable
inference from defendant's refusal is that he believed a complete
cursive writing sample would show him to be the signatory of the
forged check.

££^ Estate of

Schoch v. Kail. 311 N.W.2d 903, 907

(Neb. 1981)(unexplained failure of party to call available
witness with peculiar knowledge may permit inference that
testimony would not support party); Belanger v. Cross. 488 A.2d
410, 412-13 (R.I. 1985)(litigant's unexplained failure to produce
available witness who would be expected to give material,
favorable testimony permits inference that testimony would have
been adverse).
A handwriting expert who compared defendant's signature on
his driver's license with the signature on the forged check
16

concluded that there was a "high probability" that the two were
written by the same person (R. 363, 366). All that prevented him
from categorizing the identification as "positive" -- the highest
level of certainty — was the fact that he had only two
signatures to compare.

He explained:

Well, the documents that Detective Nielsen
had provided to me on November 7th were -the problem that we had in that particular
handwriting comparison is that he had brought
me over examples that had been printed. And
unfortunately in handwriting examination, we
can't compare oranges with apples. We have
to compare apples with apples and oranges
with oranges. Such as printed material with
printed material, or hand long written
material with hand long written material.
(R. 333-34).

He also testified that, since he had already

identified many "points of identification" that the two
signatures shared, more handwriting samples would normally only
serve to increase his level of certainty.

In his experience, he

had never made a "highly probable" identification and then become
less certain when presented with more handwriting exemplars (R.
370-72).
The eyewitness and expert testimony thus strongly pointed to
defendant as the guilty party in this case.

Thu^, even without

Holly Hales's testimony, the jury had sufficient evidence on
which to convict defendant.

Any error in the admission of Holly
17

Hales's testimony, therefore, was harmless because "there is no
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the
proceedings."

Verde/ 770 P. 2d at 120; accord State v. Olsen.

869 P.2d 1004, 1009-11 (Utah App. 1994).
POINT TWO
DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE
BECAUSE ANY ERROR HE MAY HAVE
COMMITTED DID NOT SO UNDERMINE
CONFIDENCE IN THE JURY'S VERDICT AS
TO CREATE A REASONABLE PROBABILITY
OF A DIFFERENT VERDICT
In order to establish constitutionally ineffective
assistance of counsel, defendant must show both that his
counsel's performance was so deficient that it fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and that, but for the
deficient performance, a reasonable probability existed that the
outcome of the trial would have been different.

Strickland v.

Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984); Stfrte V, TempUn, 805 P.2d
182, 186-87 (Utah 1990).
In this case, defendant alleges three instances of deficient
performance, all related to the testimony of Holly Hales: first,
that his counsel should have objected to the trial court's
failure to balance the probativeness of Hales's testimony against
its potential for unfair prejudice, as required by rule 403, Utah

18

Rules of Evidence; second, that he should have objected to the
scope of the testimony Holly Hales offered; and, third, that he
should have requested a limiting jury instruction, to make clear
to the jury how Hales's testimony could be used (Br. of App. at
17) .
To demonstrate deficient performance, the first prong of
ineffectiveness, defendant must show that his counsel "made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
'counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment."

Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687. To meet this standard, trial counsel's
representation must fall "below an objective standard of
reasonableness."

Id. at 688. Appellate courts consider the many

circumstances and decisions facing trial counsel and "indulge in
the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance."

Id. at 689.

First, defendant asserts that his counsel's performance was
constitutionally deficient because he failed to bring the 4 03
balancing test to the court's attention.

To point out that

defense counsel missed an evidentiary objection, however, falls
well short of establishing deficient performance.
v. Morris. 660 P.2d 1101, 1113 (Utah 1983).

See Codianna

Indeed, unlike rule

609, which specifically mandates application of rule 403, rule
19

404(b) makes no mention of a balancing test.

The error of

omission was not plain to the trial court or to defense counsel.
Under similar circumstances, this Court recently observed "that
the failure of counsel to object to an alleged error that is not
readily apparent cannot constitute an objectively
performance."

deficient

State v. Saunders. 893 P.2d 584, 592 (Utah App.

1995) .
Second, defendant cites three statements that he believes
his counsel should have objected to during Hales's testimony.

He

argues that his counsel should have objected to Hales's testimony
that defendant "committed forgery against her and GGG Foods using
a check from the same account as had been used in the Albertson's
forgery" (Br. of App. at 12). Plainly, however, this testimony
fell squarely within rule 404(b) and was highly probative of
defendant's access to the Circle A checks, his identity as a
person who had uttered such a check, and his knowledge and intent
with regard to use of the checks.

The evidence was highly

probative of the central issue in the case, which was defendant's
identity as the individual who presented the check at
Albertson's.

Nothing in this testimony warranted an objection

from defense counsel.
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Defendant also argues that counsel should have objected when
"Hales was allowed to testify that Young had even called her
after the incident to apologize" (Br. of App. at 13).

This

testimony, however, corroborated Hales's identification of
defendant as the person who passed the bad check in West Valley
and so was highly probative to show that Hales had correctly
identified him.
Finally, defendant believes his counsel should have objected
when Hales testified that she was fired from her job as a result
of taking the check from defendant (Br. of App. at 12). The
State agrees that this statement was objectionable because it was
not probative of any issue before the jury.

However, "counsel

need not recognize and raise every possible objection in order to
meet the competence standard."

Codianna. 660 P.2d at 1113. The

Sixth Amendment requires a competent attorney; it does not
require perfection. Id.
Third, defendant asserts that his counsel was deficient for
failing to request a jury instruction that would limit the use to
which Holly Hales's testimony could be put.

The law is well-

settled that a reviewing court presumes that counsel has rendered
adequate assistance.

Strickland/ 466 U.S. at 690.

"[W]hen

counsel has failed to take a particular action, a [reviewing
21

court] must determine whether such failure was justified by
tactical or other considerations."
1062, 1066 (Utah 1988).

State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d

If defense counsel's failure to request

the instruction Can be considered sound trial strategy, a
reviewing court will not find deficient performance.
P.2d at 1225.

Dunn, 850

In this case, defense counsel might well have

determined that it would be strategically more advantageous not
to underscore Hales's testimony with a special instruction.
gtate vr Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 187 (Utah 1990)(citing
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)

Such a decision should not be

second-guessed by this Court.
Ultimately, even apart from the weakness of his allegations
of deficient performance, defendant's ineffective assistance of
counsel claim fails because he has not demonstrated any prejudice
resulting from the admission or scope of Hales's testimony or the
omission of a limiting instruction.

Rather, he merely asserts,

without pointing to any factual support in the record, that u[i]n
this particular case, the adversarial process cannot be relied
upon as having produced a just result" and that, if counsel had
understood the rules of evidence and the law interpreting them,
the results of the trial would likely have been more favorable.
Br. of App. at 19.
22

When an appellate court considers the prejudice prong of an
ineffectiveness claim it "should consider the totality of the
evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the errors
affect the entirfe evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect
and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record."
Tempiin. 805 P.2d at 187 (quoting Strickland/ 466 U.S. at 696).
In this case, two eyewitnesses and one handwriting expert
offered testimony that pointed strongly to defendant's
culpability.

Holly Hales7s testimony, while it bolstered this

testimony, was by no means the linchpin of the case.

Indeed, in

order to acquit defendant, the jury had to believe defendant and
his father, and disbelieve not only Holly Hales, but the two
Albertson's employees, the handwriting expert, a police
detective, and a bank security officer.

Thus, Holly Hales's

testimony, while useful for the State, did not affect "the entire
evidentiary picture."

Cf. Tempiin, 805 P.2d at 188 (testimony

affecting the credibility of the only witness who gave direct
evidence of defendant's guilt affects "the entire evidentiary
picture").
The prejudice prong of defendant's ineffectiveness claim
thus fails on the same grounds as his prior claim.

Just as any

error in the trial court's failure to make an evidentiary ruling
23

proved to be harmless, so any deficient performance on the part
of defendant's trial counsel failed to create a reasonable
probability of a different outcome for him.

Failing to prove the

prejudice prong,; defendant's ineffectiveness claim must also
fail.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction.
ORAL ARGUMENT
The State requests oral argument and a written opinion in
this case.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J_ day of April, 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

w ^ C. ^MluM^
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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County Public Defenders Association, 40 South 100 West, Suite
200, Provo, Utah 84601, this J> day of April, 1996.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
Circle A Outfitter check, made out to defendant,
cashed at Albertson's
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ADDENDUM B
Circle A Outfitter check cashed by defendant
in West Valley City
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ADDENDUM C
T r i a l C o u r t ' s Memorandum D e c i s i o n

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, Stat* of Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICfdjlUKT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

#-°W

MEMORANDUM DECISION

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 941400580
DATE: January 3, 1995

vs.

JUDGE: BOYD L. PARK
CUNT D. YOUNG

CLERK: NAH

Defendant.

This matter is before the court on Defendant's Motion to Limit Admissibility of
of Evidence. The Court has read the memorandum in support of and in opposition to said
motion and being fully advised in the premises makes the following findings and conclusions.
1. Defendant's motion is a shotgun approach to the supposed evidence to be
produced at time of trial.
2. Rules 403, 404 and 609 are fact sensitive, with certain discretion in the trial
court.
3. This court is without sufficient information to make a ruling at the present time.
4. The court will refrain from a general ruling at this time and consider at the time
of trial the objections of counsel for the defendant.
5. Plaintiff's counsel should not inquire into other crimes, wrongs or bad acts of
the defendant at the time of trial without first acquiring the court's permission to do so.
6. The Court can more appropriately make its decision regarding what evidence
should be allowed at the time of trial.
7. Defendant's Motion in Limine will be considered at the time of trial, outside of
the presence and hearing of the jury and before counsel for plaintiff seeks to inquire into
areas covered by rules 403, 404, and 609.
Dated at Provo, Utah this 3rd day of Janua

JUDGE BOYD L. PARK

